The result of the referendum in the United Kingdom in 2016 to leave the European Union sparked much interest on the socio-economic characteristics of 'Brexiters'. In this article we challenge the popularised view of the Leave voter as an outsider and find that individuals from an intermediate class, whose malaise is due to a declining financial position, represent an important segment of the Brexit vote. We use individual-level data from a post-Brexit survey based on the British Election Study. Our analysis tests three predictive models. First, although our analysis confirms the negative association between education and Leave vote, we find that voting Leave is associated more with intermediate levels of education than with low or absent education, in particular in the presence of a perceived declining economic position. Secondly, we find that Brexiters hold distinct psycho-social features of malaise due to declining economic conditions, rather than anxiety or anger. Thirdly, our exploratory model finds voting Leave associated with self-identification as middle class, rather than with working class. We also find that intermediate levels of income were not more likely to vote for remain than low income groups. Overall our analysis of the Brexit vote underlines the importance of considering the political behaviour of the declining middle.
than the 'left behind'" (Swales 2016a: 2). This does not mean that socio-economic explanations of Brexit have to be excluded, but simply that those explanations have to account for socio-economic changes affecting more wider segments of the population. Although several scholars have used education to operationalize the 'left behind' argument (Hobolt 2016a, Goodwin and Heath 2016a), a missing element in the puzzle is how education is linked to socio-economic conditions. Some sociologists have suggested that the Brexit vote reflects a shift by the working class towards right-wing politics, which is the result of the lack of a left-wing option (Winlow et al, 2017 : Mckenzie 2016 . The lack of left-wing political support amongt the working class, however, is not an unknown phenomenon in political science scholarship and has characterised politics for a several decades (Inglehart, 1997; Evans 1999; Houtman, 2003) . Using the helpful distinction by Houtman et al (2009), while we know that Brexit reflects cultural voting (voting for an authoritarian agenda), we lack evidence that it represents class voting (defined as voting on the grounds of economically egalitarian political values generated by a weak class position).
The image of the Leave voter as left behind is not only related to personal finance and class, but also to specific psycho-social conditions, such as the anger of the globalisation losers. Previous studies on Brexit have left untapped the distinct psycho-social characteristics of Leavers and how this relates to their socio-economic conditions. The culture of risk and of manufactured uncertainty described by risk scholars such as Beck (2009) has permeated the referendum campaign, both from the Leave and the Remain side (Burgess 2016) . It has also resulted in a confusion between objective and imaginary risks. For example migration has been a core motivation behind the vote (Ashcroft 2016 ) despite its lack of objective impact on the lives of Leavers (Becker et al 2016) . Anger and fear expressed by the Leave voters could therefore be the reaction to uncertainty that reflects the passage to a globalised society where risk is more prevalent (Beck 1992 , Giddens 1991 . As well as understanding Leavers' individual socio-economic context it is, therefore, crucial to interpret their psycho-social profile and to clarify how this might be related to their personal economic conditions. In our study we specifically address the issue of globalisation in relation to social risks. In the next paragraph we describe our framework to contribute to these unanswered issues.
The conceptual framework
The terminology of the 'left behind' (see Hobolt, 2016a; Goodwin and Heath 2016b) suggests that Brexit has been the voice of a small and marginalised segment of the population, but authors have suggested that the Brexit vote represents a more general malaise amongst the 'ordinary' British people (Hobolt 2016b). The Leave vote is not uniformly represented by one social group and is much more widespread among the population than the left behind argument would suggest.
We discuss the social malaise expressed through the Brexit vote by including a missing category in the analysis of the vote: the intermediate class. In doing this we are implicitly rejecting the dichotomous class division 'middle' versus 'working class'. The recent literature in contemporary social policy shows that the economic vulnerability of the intermediate class has increased in the last years. This intermediate group has been defined as the 'squeezed middle', a term originally coined in the United States, which has been also applied to describe the situation of British ordinary workers coping with the increasing cost of living and inflation (Parker, 2013 (Hills, 2014) and the declining capacity of contemporary welfare states to protect the 'middle' against social risks (Hacker, 2008 and 2011) . It is not, therefore, a group that can be defined as 'left out', 'outsider' or responds to the description of the low skilled globalisation loser in classical terms. It is rather a group in the middle which has been affected by the increasing social vulnerability in the society (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2016; Ranci, 2010) .
Our models broadly explore the links between voters' financial position, in absolute as well as dynamic terms, and the referendum vote, in relation to three groups of key individual characteristics; education, psycho-social conditions, and social class identification. Ultimately, we hypothesise intermediate classes to be more likely to vote Leave. We present and test our hypotheses using the following three groups of models, which allow to operationalize the theory of the squeezed middle as the core segment of the population to drive the Leave vote:
The educational and declining economic position of 'leavers' The left-behind argument has been pointed to in terms of voters having low levels of education (and therefore low skills) to compete in the globalised economy, as opposed to those with a university degree (see Hobolt, 2016a; Goodwin and Heath, 2016a) . We problematize this notion of the left behind. In early descriptive studies, educational differences found among Remainers and Leavers could simply reflect the fact that the younger generation, which were more likely to vote for Remain, are also better educated. Moreover, the higher percentage of people with lower educational attainments among Leavers could reflect the fact that people with low education hold more authoritarian values, which according to Kaufman (2016) are the ultimate drivers of the vote. Analyses exploring the relationship between the propensity to vote Leave and education in relation to other socioeconomic variables have found a more nuanced picture of the Leave voter than extends beyond their lack of education.
For example, Goodwin and Heath (2016a) have explored the relationship between education and regional opportunities, finding that Leave vote is explained by an interaction effect between individual level of education and the profile of the area where they live. Their analysis shows that in 'low skilled communities' even graduates were more likely to vote for Brexit than graduates from high skilled communities and had similar profiles to those with low education from the same communities. In our first model, we explore why the probability of voting Leave is high only among those with low levels of education or whether it includes those with intermediate levels of education. Further, we try to understand how the probability of voting for Leave among different educational groups changes in respect to dynamics of personal finance.
Leavers and the psycho-social effects of globalisation
Some authors have hinted at Leavers displaying distinct psycho-social feelings of malaise regarding globalisation (Goodwin and Heath, 2016b; Hobolt,2016a) . It has not yet been clarified, however, whether this reflects objective change in standards of living or a generalised attitude towards the new risks associated with globalisation.
The idea that globalisation is associated with emotional sentiments is not new in the literature and Brexit can be interpreted as another case of the 'political economy of uncertainty' described by Beck (1999) . Among Leavers we can recognize, for example, the risk of losing one's individual position as a consequence of higher migration flows linked to EU membership -a risk that the vote in itself offered to resolve. Authors have previously found negative feelings associated with the management of risk stemming from globalisation. Beck's notion of 'individualisation' is described as "a default outcome of a failure of expert systems to manage risks." (Beck, 2006: 336) . Globalisation generates negative feelings:
individuals are described to be resentful (Brown, 1993) and fearful (Pain, 2009 ).
Some of these feelings are related to issues at the core of the Brexit debate, such as migration. The study by Clarke (2009) , for example, describes how the possibility of migration per se poses a symbolic threat to the "emotional construction of the white identity" built around the imaginary golden age of English white communities.
In our framework, we begin by exploring the effect of basic emotions, untested in the Brexit debate, to build the foundation for discussing more specific psycho-social feelings, such as life satisfaction, and standing in society. While anxiety has been linked to voting behaviour in terms of increased information search and a propensity for opinion change (e.g. Marcus et al 2000), anxiety effects are untheorised in relation to declining finances and/or supporting an anti-elitist agenda, and only anecdotal evidence linked it to the Brexit vote. We thus hypothesize that anxiety over one's life could be a potential contributing factor to the decision to vote Leave, in particular in the context of a declining financial situation. Further, we test whether a distinct anger effect describes Leavers, who are, much more likely to challenge the status quo as 'blame' is not uncertain (as in anxiety), but aimed at the specific actor (namely the European Institutions, see Wagner 2014).
We then proceed to explore the crucial issue of psycho-social features, in particular in relation to personal economic conditions. Our psycho-social wellbeing indicators concern quality of life, and we explicitly test whether the feeling of being left behind, feeling life has got complicated, and negative feelings over doing something worthwhile in life characterise Leavers as a group. We conclude our discussion by exploring whether the feeling of being left behind is related to a deteriorating financial position, which would affect, not only the working class, also the 'squeezed The Brexit vote raises interesting questions regarding the reconfiguration of the class structure. Recent studies on self-perception of class in the UK show that most people perceive themselves as 'working class' even if they hold 'middle class jobs' (Swales, 2016b) and, therefore, they rather belong to what we define as the squeezed middle.
The dichotomous nature of the class debate in the UK creates confusion in interpreting the class politics behind Brexit. For example, sociologists who interpret Brexit as working class vote assume that this class vote carries egalitarian claims (see Winlow et al, 2017; Mckenzie, 2016) . Empirical studies have found that the vote of Leavers with limited socio-economic resources was associated to authoritarian (Ashcroft 2016 ) and anti-immigrant sentiments associated with the vote of economically deprived Leavers (see Swales 2016a).
Through our final exploratory model we will attempt to overcome the current limitations of Brexit's analyses in relation to class by investigating the selfidentification of class of Leave voters and we also analyse this in relation to objective measures of inequality. We hypothesise that the self-identification as working class was not a driver of the Leave vote, rather we expect a higher proportion of Leavers among those identifying themselves as middle class or those that have no class identification.
Methodology
To investigate our hypotheses and explore measurement options to describe the 'squeezed middle', we rely on three data sources: our online opt-in panel implemented shortly after the referendum that ran from 28 June until 10 July 2016, the British Election Study Internet Panel referendum campaign wave (Evans et al 2016) and our own referendum campaign study running through June 2016.
Our sample respondents are recruited from the pool of users of our UK Voting Advice Applications (VAAs), available on the web in 2015 (during the General Elections campaign) and 2016 (during the Brexit campaign). VAAs are relatively new online information tools attracting potentially millions of users designed to make party and candidate positions more accessible by comparing users and parties on an interactive landscape (see Garzia and Marshall, 2012) .
While interacting with these tools, VAA users have the option to sign up for followup surveys, which is how we accessed data for our pre-and post-referendum studies.
Although we did obtain a reasonably large and diverse sample in the post-referendum wave (N = 2,809), we acknowledge self-selection bias on a host of indicators. VAA users and opt-in respondents tend to be more urban, male, politically interested individuals with higher education (Pianzola and Ladner, 2011).
Thus we benchmark our sample to the British Election Study, and compute poststratification weights to each respondent in our panel. This enables us to use a nonrepresentative sample to make reasonable population-level inference (Popp et al (2016) provides a more detailed review).
1 The next section describes our key measures of model building and hypothesis testing.
Models
We fit five mixed-effects logistic regressions with probability to vote Leave as the dependent variable and a host of individual-level variables exploring education (also in relation to personal economic conditions), psycho-social wellbeing and class. We also control for age, gender, and political support. (Figure 1) we take a step further by looking at the relationship between
Leave vote and education in relation to the dynamic aspect of personal finances. We are interested in how a perceived change in personal finances in the past five years might moderate the education effects and thus define an interaction between them.
Our analysis is limited by the fact that we analysed changes in dynamics of personal finances by relying on the self-report of respondents which might be biased. We find, however, that this is the only indicator, albeit limited, that can grasp economic dynamics among referendum's voters.
We measure the dynamic change in personal finances through the following variables (see Table 1 in Appendix 2): ∆personal fin.-same which compares the effect of stagnation to that of a positive change and ∆personal fin.-worse which compares the effect of worsening conditions as opposed to positive change. We also explore if this dynamic changes depending on education levels.
Psycho-social effects of globalisation. We explore the effects of Quality of Life indicators (adapted from European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions (2012) In Model 2.2 we explore whether the widely cited 'left out effect' has any foundation in worsening economic conditions. We therefore explore an interaction effect between psycho-social factors and evaluations of changes in personal finance. As before, we acknowledge that our analysis is limited through our reliance on selfreport. As this Model entirely relies on personal perceptions we do not find that selfassessment of financial changes might be affected by specific feelings expressed by the voter.
Income and social class self-identification. We treat Model 3 separately as an exploratory analysis of self-assessment of class and income categories. We take this data from the smaller, common set of respondents of the post-referendum study and the campaign wave study,. We explore respondent's identification with the following social classes: working class, middle class, or none of the above (the latter is our baseline category). This helps us to clarify which classes, if any, Leavers identify with and allows us to critically analyse the interpretation of the referendum as 'a vote of the working class'. We acknowledge the limitations of relying on self-assessment of class using the existing literature on class self-assessment. To complement our analysis in Model 1.2 we also analyse vote Leave in relation to reported income.
This allows us to evaluate whether the results are consistent with the squeezed middle class argument that we propose.
Findings
The full results of our five models are presented in Table 1 in the Appendix 2. In this section we briefly report on the behaviour of our basic geographic, demographic as well as political support predictors, and the sections below detail the specific effects we present as evidence of our hypotheses.
We detect significant age and gender effects, and confirm that voters of UK Independence Party (UKIP) were most likely to vote Leave (up to 46 times more likely than Conservatives, the baseline category) followed by Conservative voters, and non-voters (their odds being about 50-50). This pattern is broken only in our exploratory, small-sample analysis on income and social class identification, where age and gender effects vanish.
3
Education & lowering economic position
In Model 1.1 (Figure 1) we focus on the effect of formal education. We detect significant effects associated with each education level. 
Psycho-social effects
Our results with regards to emotions and quality of life variables partly confirm the losers of globalisation hypothesis.
Looking at the results of Model 2.1, we find no evidence that feeling left out of society is a predictor of voting leave. However, we find that other wellbeing 
Income and social class self-identification
Regarding income in Model 3, our findings on class self-identification are contrary to the narrative that suggests that voting Leave is not associated with selfidentification as working class, but rather with those that self-identify as middle class, or having no class at all (β = 0.94, t(0.39) Swales (2016a), Brexit was not the voice of a unique segment of the society; rather was supported by a heterogeneous group including also the middle class. In addition we are able to confirm, as suggested by Dorling (2016) , that the group that does not identify as 'working-class' is predominant in quantitative terms.
We then analyse whether Brexit has been supported by an intermediate group in objective terms. In order to do this, we look at the probability of the Leave vote in terms of income, which enables us to overcome the misleading analytical division between working and middle classes in the UK class debate. Relying on the observed range of income, we split up the distribution into equally-sized groups and used these quantiles in our model. The result is partly similar to previous reports in that higher income would link to the 'remain' vote. However, we are also able to point out that it is only the top quantile, the richest respondents, that slant significantly to the 'remain' side (β = −1.94, t(0.49), p < .001). We do not find enough evidence to show that the effect of income is incremental: that the intermediate class, in income terms, would be more likely to vote 'remain' than the poorest groups.
We show the predicted probabilities by income and class-identification in Figure 3 . It is also apparent that our prediction intervals are wide, which further prompts us to interpret our small-sample results with caution.
Figure 3 here
Predicted probabilities by income quantiles and class identification (Model 3)
Conclusion
The Leave vote has presented a puzzle to social scientists: it is a vote that has reflected a widely felt socio-economic malaise, but it could not be interpreted as the voice of a socially homogenous social group. Our analysis of post-Brexit individuallevel data offers a new reading, which challenges the dominant narrative of the Brexiter as an angry and left behind individual. We believe that socio-economic effects were central in interpreting the Brexit vote, but we also find the socioeconomic malaise does not represent a group which has entirely lost out from globalisation, as opposed to one that has gained (Hobolt 2016a). The core group behind the vote is, according to us an intermediate group whose position is declining, a group which has been described as having high relevance for policy and politics (Parker, 2013; Hacker, 2011; Ranci, 2010) . The reason for this decline of the middle could be found in overall processes of globalisation (Rodrik, 1998) or in more recent was further confirmed by the fact that Brexiters felt that life has become more complicated. We also find that those experiencing feelings of having been left out from the society are more likely to vote Leave only when they feel to have experienced worsening financial condition in the last years. This points to the dynamics experienced by the squeezed middle rather than to the presence a crystallised left behind group. Future studies could explore which specific elements of globalisation drove these feelings (for example, migration flows, the activity of multi-national companies).
A more extreme form of the 'left behind' argument, that has widely featured in public and political debates, suggests that Leave voters represent conscious working class voting. In our final exploratory model this hypothesis is rejected, as an association between identifying as middle-class and vote Leave was found -as well as no association with 'working class' self-identification. We also found that those in intermediate income groups were not more likely to vote for remain than those in low income groups. In this case, as in the case of education, those with top-income drive the negative correlation between income and voting for Remain. Individuallevel explanations have therefore clarified that the groups behind the Leave vote are not just those at the bottom of the social scale.
Our attempt to operationalize the 'squeezed middle' in voting behaviour is, in many respects, exploratory and could be further expanded by including employment positions and salaries -crucial indicators that were not in our dataset. We intend to carry out further research on integrating the measurement of inequality with that of political behaviours to understand the role of the declining middle in forthcoming elections in Europe. Further, we acknowledge the limitation of the research design in that most of our predictor variables are measured after the vote has been cast and the
Appendix 1
Further details on methodology
The following sections give further details on the methodology. For a full discussion, please consult our online appendix at www.voteadvice.org/squeezed-online.html
Our primary data source is the opt-in panel implemented as post-referendum study.
In total, 2,809 respondents, previous VAA users, have opted in taking the survey. In this, our primary aim was to gauge the voting population's vote recall and search for possible explanations, through socio-demographics, political issue and party preferences, leader evaluations, as well as measures of psycho-social wellbeing.
Consistent with research on the use of VAAs for academic research (Pianzola and
Ladner 2011), we find that the over-sampled segments come from urban areas, men, the age category of late-twenties to mid-thirties, as well as the higher educated.
Using this information, as well as vote intention amongst likely voters, we compute post-stratification weights so that the joint distribution of these variables mirrors that of the likely voter subsample of British Election Study pre-referendum wave. We use the package survey in R to perform this task.
To evaluate the outcome, we build a 'Null', random effects logistic regression model where the dependent variable is probability to vote Leave, predicted by region only.
This allows us to generate 11 Leave probabilities, for each region:
This random component is common in all subsequent models we build for hypothesis testing. We use the package lme4 (Bates et al 2015) in R to fit these models, accounting for the prior weights. We then exploit the ability of arm (Gelman
